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The EU has tightened its definition of terrorism, yet gaps still remain. The nexus between 
public (national security and law enforcement) services and private commercial operators 
needs further examination. This contribution proposes a global nodal governance of security, 
focusing on this public/private security nexus. This should be developed through the use of 
reflexive law-based mechanisms, supported by and working with traditional criminal law, to 
comply with the principle of legality. This would enable state security and law enforcement 
to benefit from the expertise and knowledge based in financial and technology commercial 
operators for the benefit of terrorism prevention. 
 
 
1. Introduction    
 
 
The European Union (EU) has recently updated its provisions on terrorism through the 
passing of Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combatting terrorism, replacing the earlier Council 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA. A directive is an order to member states to pass law. 
Post-Lisbon (and pre-Brexit) these new counter-terrorism provisions needed to have been 
enacted in 24 individual EU member states’ legislation by the 8th September 2018. The 
Commission will undertake a full review of its implementation, and its effectiveness, in due 
course. The UK, Ireland and Denmark are maintaining opt-out positions on this directive. 
This directive provides for ten distinct terrorist offences (Article 3), seven offences related to 
terrorism, and three further “other offences related to terrorism”. While much of the earlier 
framework decision is replicated, there are some substantial new offences, in particular the 
other “offences related to terrorism”. Many arise at the nexus between security and private 
commerce, for example financial or IT companies hereinafter “commercial operators”. They 
include “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence” (Article 5), “recruitment for 
terrorism” (Article 6), “providing training for terrorism” (Article 7), “organising or otherwise 
facilitating travelling for the purpose of terrorism” (Article 10) and terrorist financing, 
(Article 11). This could have major ramifications for commercial operators, who are involved 
in publishing material on social media, (or providing the means to publish, depending on how 
a particular law is interpreted), which could lead to training, incitement or recruitment for 
terrorism. Others could be involved in providing travel packages which are used by terrorist 
organisations for the purpose of travelling for terrorism. Other commercial operators may be 
in the business of providing or maintaining financial mechanisms which end up being used 
for the purpose of collecting or transferring funds to pay for terrorist activities. The relevant 
commercial operators are not in the business of security provision, and therefore cannot be 
classified as private security providers. The term, “private security providers” has been 
adopted in the literature to mean those whose primary commercial focus is the provision of 




This chapter will examine the provisions of the 2017 counter-terrorism directive, focusing on 
the issues which arise with regard to the regulation of the private/public security nexus. In 
particular many of the commercial operators relevant to this analysis, such as internet service 
providers, operate in a transnational context. The traditional command (you will not do this) 
and control (and if you do we will punish you) approach to the drafting of criminal law 
legislation shows its limitations in two contexts. The first of these limitations arise in the 
regulation of constantly changing complex situations. These would include newly developed 
banking services and the rapidly evolving world of technology. Also of interest to this paper 
is the way that technology, to include the internet, is being used by, inter alia, criminals and 
terrorist organisations, and those who inspire individual terrorists. Traditionally drafted 
legislation, with its requirement under the principle of legality, to be precise and focused, has 
a problem keeping up with rapidly evolving situations. The second weakness arises when the 
laws of an individual jurisdiction try to influence individuals and companies which operate 
transnationally, and which are not based in that particular jurisdiction. 
 
A late 20th century concept of reflexive law is worth examining in the context of the public/ 
private security nexus, to include its transnational context. As stated by Kennedy (2015, 
p.129), reflexive law is a concept of law which is based on “renouncing standards and targets 
in favour of communication and structural supports for contemplation”. The practice of using 
the ideas which underpin reflexive law which is now emerging, has built on Teubner’s (1983) 
original concept, which itself was a development of earlier responsive law theories. It 
requires the “fusion of public and private governance regimes” (Janczuk-Gorywoda, 2012, 
p.1439), such as, in the context of this contribution, those of technology companies and 
national security and law enforcement agencies. Rather than relying exclusively on the 
traditional “‘vertical’ subordination of citizens to their sovereigns” there is a focus on 
“‘horizontal’ relations between equally situated market actors” (Caruso, 2002, p.3), in public-
private governance regimes. The motivation for states is that with the shift from “government 
to governance” across a range of sectors, law, as traditionally designed and operated, begins 
to show its limitations and “appears to have become a fragile project” (Zumbansen, 2008, 
p.771). Businesses’ motivation to engage with mechanisms based on reflexive law is that 
they are “seeking to move ‘beyond compliance’” focusing, for example in the environmental 
sector, on “voluntary performance of targets and internal environmental management 
systems”, thereby avoiding what would otherwise be very expensive environmental litigation 
(Kennedy, 2015, p.129). In addition, the relevant environmental commercial operators would 
be avoiding very poor public and customer relations. In this process business can contribute 
to the development of collaborative solutions to evolving complex problems, leading to 
benefit for themselves, government, and the subject matter of their concerns, such as the 
environment.  
 
If deployed carefully, regulation based on the reflexive law concept should prove to be an 
additional tool to bring about a change in behaviour in the market. All the underpinning 
criminal offences would still have to be legislated for in accompanying traditional command 
and control legislation in order to comply with the principle of legality. Regulation based on 
reflexive law has the greatest impact on the global market place if enacted by key 
jurisdictions, those with the largest revenue generating power for commercial operators. 
These would typically be the US, EU and UK. Together these jurisdictions could enact 
corporate governance standards, requiring reflexive law mechanisms to be used to ensure that 
commercial operators do not undermine the law enforcement and security requirements of 
states. Commercial operators, in order to operate efficiently, usually align their internal 
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operations and standards to those of their largest export markets, and where these have 
differing standards, to the export market with the highest standards.  
 
This chapter proposes a nodal governance of security based on reflexive law concepts 
adopted by the above key jurisdictions. This should be deployed when tackling transnational 
threats which arise at the point where global business interacts with counter-terrorism 
operations. Different states’ national security and law enforcement agencies would be key 
nodes in the proposed framework. Market leaders from the commercial world would also 
have to be included in the nodal framework, as there would be a need to harness the abilities 
of highly trained knowledge makers, such as the leading computer programmers and software 
developers, or the commercially based developers of new financial products, to assist in 
designing and maintaining compliance and reporting mechanisms. This chapter will first take 
an overview of key new provisions of the 2017 counter-terrorism directive. It will then go on 
to focus on the public-private security nexus, the point where commercial operators, in their 
day to day business activities bisect the work of national security and law enforcement 
agencies. The use of reflexive law-based mechanisms in the governance of security will then 
be examined. The chapter will go on to examine possible use of a nodal governance of 
security and will then sketch out some of the issues around one such security nexus under the 
counter-terrorism directive, that of technology companies. 
 
 
2. The 2017 directive on Counter-terrorism    
 
 
The new EU counter-terrorism directive (Directive (EU) 2017/541) recognises that “the 
terrorist threat has grown and rapidly evolved in recent years” (paragraph 4, Preamble). 
Closely allied is the four pillared (prevent, protect, pursue, respond) EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy (2005), which was further developed and revised in 2014. These have been closely 
monitored in light of recent terrorist developments. This contribution feeds into the evolving 
“prevent” pillar of the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, an issue also explored elsewhere in 
this book by Silva and Deflem. While the intelligence services of the EU member states are 
not formally coordinated at an EU level, the role of all other actors, to include police, 
prosecutors, banks, etc. is reflected in EU legal and policy provisions. For example, 
provisions have been put in place providing for transnational cooperation for national law 
enforcement and prosecutors, while coordination of responses are provided for in the context 
of counter-terrorism for customs, border forces, military etc. Recognising that the term 
“police” is used more narrowly in many EU countries, particularly those with gendarmerie, 
than in the English-speaking world, the terms police and law enforcement are used 
interchangeably in this contribution.  
 
Reflecting the evolving nature of the terrorist threat, and the need for all jurisdictions to be 
able to effectively prosecute and imprison, the range of offences under the directive, as 
enumerated above, is broader than under the earlier framework decision. The 2002 
framework decision on counter-terrorism did legislate for directing a terrorist group, or 
participating in terrorist activities, however the new directive (Article 13) provides that “it 
shall not be necessary that a terrorist offence be actually committed” for an offence under the 
directive to occur. It could just as easily read that it is not necessary for a terrorist attack be 
actually committed. The emphasis of the EU counter terrorism strategy, and intelligence led 
policing more generally, is as much “prevent” and “protect” before an attack, as “pursue” and 
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“respond” after the event. This is to be welcomed as it should therefore be easier to convict 
across the EU after an intelligence-led disruption of a planned terrorist attack.  
 
Many of the offences new to this directive, (public provocation, recruitment, training, 
travelling etc. Articles 5-11) could easily involve both national and transnational private 
commercial operators. Travel companies, social media platforms or other internet-based 
businesses will need to ensure that they are not facilitating any of these additional offences. 
particularly as the liability of legal persons continues to be covered by the directive (Article 
17). In particular, aiding and abetting of any of these offences, to include the new offences, 
with the exception of travel, and inciting in the case of travel, are also to be treated as an 
offence (Article 14). From a perusal of the available literature, it is not clear why travel is 
being treated differently.  
 
Some EU jurisdictions, unfortunately, encounter terrorism situations on a much more 
frequent basis than others and would therefore be more experienced in tackling different 
types of terrorist activities. For example, Europol’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 
2018, reporting on the situation in 2017 in 28 EU member states, reported on 205 foiled, 
failed or completed attacks, with over half of those being in the UK. Over a quarter of the 
attacks were reported by France, with a further seven EU member states reporting one or 
more attacks in 2017. This left 19 EU member states in the position of having had no terrorist 
attacks to report in 2017. A larger number of EU countries (19) were however reporting on 
terrorism arrests made during the year. Therefore, the EU, in adopting a broad and muti-
faceted definition of terrorism, will be spreading a comprehensive approach to legislating for 
terrorism offences among its member states. There will still, however, be some disparity 
across EU jurisdictions in tacking terrorism due to some of the legal provisions in the EU 
directive being mandatory, while others are optional. Mandatory provisions provide a base 
line definition of terrorism, so that other cross border law enforcement mechanisms, such as 
Joint Investigation Teams and European Arrest Warrants can operate. Optional provisions are 
recommendations to legislate, however, national legal or practical considerations may affect 
uptake of these recommendations. New in the directive, an EU member state may extend its 
jurisdiction for Article 7 offences (providing training for terrorism) to cover “providing 
training for terrorism where the offender provides training to its nationals or residents” 
(Article 19.1.c). There is no requirement that that training be provided in either that state or 
any other EU member state. In addition, each member state can “extend its jurisdiction if the 
offence is committed in the territory of another member state” (Article 19.1). As the directive 
was to be implemented by the 8th September 2018, it is as yet too early to say what the likely 
uptake of this provision will be across the EU. The EU Commission will conduct an analysis 
of the implementation of the directive in due course. Uptake of these provisions will depend 
on how a particular jurisdiction reacts to extra-territorial effect of its laws, with some being 
more enthusiastic in its use, such as England & Wales, than others.  
 
Expressly provided in the directive but implied in the framework decision (Article 20.1), 
effective investigative tools “such as those which are used in organised crime or other serious 
crime cases” need to be available for combatting terrorism offences. Some jurisdictions have 
seen a clear dividing line between organised crime (low policing) and counter-terrorism (high 
policing) and allocated relevant forces different powers and capabilities. The EU is aiming to 
see all agencies (other than specialised intelligence services, such as the UK intelligence 
services, over which it has no jurisdiction) have all legal tools available to them, to include 
those originally developed by organised crime and drug trafficking officers, in order to 
effectively combat both national and transnational terrorism. In addition, those working on a 
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counter-terrorism operation should ideally be able to engage with their counterparts in the 
next jurisdiction, even if one or other force is not a specialist counter-terrorism unit (as long 
as all officers have the necessary security clearances). In addition, police in one jurisdiction 
may need to interact with customs, border force etc. in another jurisdiction.  
 
With a specific focus on the issue of on-line content which would assist with either 
radicalising or training potential terrorists, taking a command and control approach to 
regulation Article 21 of the new directive provides that “member states shall take necessary 
measures to ensure the prompt removal of online content constituting public provocation to 
commit terrorist offences… hosted in their territory”. In addition, “they shall endeavour to 
obtain the removal of such content hosted outside their territory”. The directive does not 
provide how this objective is to be achieved. If the removal of content is “not feasible”, then 
the directive goes on to provide (Article 21.2) that the member state shall “take measures to 
block access to such content towards the internet users within their territory”. Article 21.3 
sets out the parameters for national measures for removal and blocking of relevant online 
content.  
 
Now that there is a requirement in the directive to legislate for terrorism offences which 
involves commercial operators, there is a need to develop a governance framework involving 
both key national security and law enforcement agencies and relevant commercial operators. 
The 2017 counter-terrorism directive did not however address the issue of how such a 
framework would be developed. This paper proposes the development of a governance 
framework using a nodal governance of security based on reflexive law. Rather than using 
territorially based command and control legislation, or piecemeal negotiated solutions with 
one or more of the current commercial operators in one or more national jurisdiction, this 
should assist in developing long term mutually beneficial relationships between the relevant 
commercial operators and key national security and law enforcement agencies. The arising 
public-private security nexus and the possibility to develop a nodal form of governance to 
address that nexus will now be examined. 
 
 
3. Public-Private security nexus   
 
 
Many academics, such as Stenning (2000) and Wakefield (2016), have been examining the 
role of the police, and concepts underpinning both policing and the provision of security in 
recent years, to include the role of private security providers and their interaction with the 
police. Less emphasis to date has been put on the current or potential role of the non-security 
providing corporate world in assisting law enforcement and counter-terrorism, through the 
provision of information which has the potential to be developed by national security and law 
enforcement agencies into intelligence. Intelligence-led policing is a style of policing initially 
developed in the UK (Radcliffe, 2016), and has now, at least for transnational law 
enforcement, been adopted by EU member states. The processing of intelligence for 
intelligence led policing is also the key function of Europol. Brodeur (2010, p.309), in his 
attempts to map those involved in policing, developed a concept of the “outer edges of 
policing”. Brodeur’s concept of policing, to include its outer edges, does not involve either 
“intelligence led policing”, or the feeding of intelligence from the outer edges of policing to 
the state forces or agencies. Brodeur (2010) does address “private policing” in the context of 
the “outer edges of policing”, adopting this term in the context of private security providers. 
Of more direct relevance to the outer edges of intelligence policing, Gottschalk (2016) 
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examines the role of fraud examiners in private policing, establishing that they operate in 
parallel with state law enforcement, with little interaction between the two. This lack of 
interaction is highly problematic. If there is no mechanism or practice for those such as fraud 
examiners to feed intelligence to state agencies or forces, then they cannot be contributing to 
the outer edges of intelligence led policing by state forces or agencies. There would appear to 
be a breakdown in intelligence sharing by those engaged in private policing roles, presumably 
tasked with narrow corporate interest roles, with the state forces and agencies which have 
been tasked with general public security. The term “private policing” has not been used in the 
literature to address the involvement of commercial operators which, as a result of their 
primary commercial operations, can, as a secondary product, acquire information which is of 
use to state security and law enforcement services, as the ingredient for developing actionable 
intelligence, either to combat organised crime, or to counter terrorism. It is for that reason 
that the term commercial operators is being used in this chapter to refer to those which could 
fulfil this role.  
 
A further issue in the context of commercial operators which operate transnationally is that 
traditional security and law enforcement structures have been designed to secure the post-
Westphalian state. Protecting one’s own state is not always aligned with taking action to 
protect another state, or stateless persons, or even human beings generally. State structures 
need to be further developed in order to combat the increasing phenomenon of transnational 
serious and organised crime, or transnational terrorism. Criminal law as usually devised and 
operated falls into command and control regulatory frameworks, as does the design and 
operation of their associated policing frameworks. With traditional legal frameworks the 
issue of “the application of domestic law to international actors” arises, as “the power of 
command-and-control regulation largely [stopping] at the border” (Girard, 2014. p.321, 2). 
States regularly encounter problems regulating behaviour which occurs beyond its borders, 
even if the effect of that behaviour is felt within its territory. In particular, it is very difficult 
for a state criminal law structure to punish those outside its borders. Only in exceptional cases 
will another state assist in prosecution or extradition proceedings. Some new mechanism 
need to be developed to cover the increasing level of threat arising from globalisation. In 
addition, traditional “command-and-control is too static” (Orts, 1995, p.782). Writing in the 
context of environmental regulation, Orts (1995) points out that “command-and-control 
establishes performance and technological standards” (p.782), but by the time the law has 
been passed or adopted, technology has moved on, and knowledge has changed (p.782). The 
same can be said for the transnational terrorist threat.  
 
In addressing the twin issues of developing a workable extra territorial effect of domestic law 
and the regulating of rapidly evolving areas such as technology, it is necessary to refocus and 
broaden the debate on law enforcement. The change in focus from “police” to “policing” has 
already happened (Shearing 2001). Brodeur (2010) has moved from “policing” to the 
“governance of security”. Governance of security sets frameworks within which commercial 
operators and national security and law enforcement agencies can operate and interact. 
Commercial operators can both combat the publication of radicalisation material on their own 
platforms and report information to the relevant authorities. This would protect them from 
possible prosecution, from exploitation by organised crime or terrorist groups, protect their 
consumer base, and be good public relations and corporate governance behaviour. The 
communicated information could then be developed into actionable intelligence, leading to 
more focused traditional policing or counter-terrorism operations. The involvement of 
commercial operators in the design of laws would not necessarily be a radical departure from 
the current situation, as national and transnational commercial operators, such as internet 
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service providers, have already engaged in processes involving the shaping of regulation 
(Bures and Carapicio, 2017, p.234).  
 
Shifting focus to the “governance of security” from “policing” allows for the development of 
the concept of “a regulated network of participatory ‘nodes’” (Shearing, 2001, p.261) in a 
transnational public/private commercial operator context. As Shearing (2001) has stated, each 
of these nodes can then be designed to have the “authority, capacity and knowledge that 
together provide for the governance [of] security”. Nodal governance means that all parties in 
the network have the ability and opportunity to influence the other. It is in this context that 
the nodal governance of security becomes relevant, with Shearing (2001, p.261) advocating 
that “effective and efficient governance requires the mobilisation of a network of capacities 
and knowledges located within a variety of institutional nodes” to include the leading 
developers of relevant technology.  
 
New and emerging commercial operators would have to be welcomed into this nodal 
governance framework in order to achieve maximum market coverage, and also, from a 
commercial point of view, ensure that the cost of compliance is borne by all players in the 
market. Commercial operators would bear their share of the costs of compliance through the 
requirement to internalise their obligations under the governance of security framework into 
their own corporate governance structures and processes. Their own auditors would be 
required to investigate and report on compliance, possibly with reports being sent to 
regulatory authorities as part of the usual corporate reporting cycles. Even if this is not 
required in the home jurisdiction of the relevant corporate structure, a licence to operate 
within, say the EU, UK or US could be withheld if these reports are not made, either in the 
company’s home jurisdiction, or where this is not possible reports could be made to their 
counterparts within the nodal governance framework. The sharing of best practice between 
commercial operators, or between leading IT based national security agencies and 
commercial operators, to include the most effective approaches and technological responses, 
might also be encouraged. 
 
Commercial operators often have highly skilled knowledge workers who can, while still 
focused on the business plans of their employers, if properly harnessed, add value to national 
security and law enforcement activities. Brodeur (2010) refers to “smart crime”, where crime 
is “increasingly defined as knowledge-based” and where public policing, on its own, is 
“minimally effective” (p.254). Only the knowledge makers of the commercial operators, 
based in financial and IT companies can keep up with the fast-changing pace of 
developments in some sectors of society. Commercial operators are therefore needed to assist 
in designing and maintaining compliance and reporting mechanisms. Transnational 
commercial operators are also often operating beyond national command and control legal 
frameworks. As a result, new forms of conceptualising governance of security frameworks 
and new forms of regulating these frameworks are necessary. 
 
The limits of national criminal law and law enforcement have been recognised for many 
years. There has been an allied recognition of the need to develop transnational law 
enforcement networks. As well as developing such networks within the EU, the EU has been 
developing similar provisions with non-EU member states, such as Europol operational 
agreements with the US, Australia, Canada and a number of countries directly neighbouring 
the EU, and Eurojust’s variety of agreements with third states and organisations involving 
cooperation agreements, liaison prosecutors and contact points. These can provide models for 
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state to state cooperation globally. They do, however, need to be further developed in order to 
encompass the transnational corporate world, as suggested in this chapter.  
 
A nodal governance of security structure, designed and implemented by earlier adopter 
jurisdictions and commercial operators, operating under relevant regulatory frameworks, 
could be further developed and added to as more jurisdictions enact the relevant legislation. 
Information being passed to state security or law enforcement agencies, as appropriate for the 
relevant jurisdiction, can then be disseminated, in accordance with relevant national laws, 
and, in the context of the EU, data protection and data security rules, to other state law 
enforcement and security agencies. This would involve using either already developed, or 
developing, transnational law enforcement or security networks.  
 
A nodal governance framework, building on earlier concepts of the “governance of security” 
(Brodeur, 2010, p.9) would therefore have to be developed, involving multiple jurisdictions, 
their national security and law enforcement agencies, and relevant commercial operators. As 
Burris, Drahos & Shearing (2005, p.33) point out, nodal governance is based on 
“contemporary network theory”, which “explains how a variety of actors operating within 
social systems interact along networks to govern the systems they inhabit”. In this way, these 
nodes “mobilize the knowledge and capacity of members to manage the course of events” 
(ibid.). Each of the members of the network are nodes, with the nodes, some more so, some 





The development of the governance of security frameworks to address a similar 
private/public security nexus in the area of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism 
financing is instructive. These originate from the G7’s Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
recommendations (FATF web site), which have been adopted globally. Adoption has been 
encouraged or required by regional anti-money laundering organisations, such as the 
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, as is the case for the US and China, or through 
regional integration organisations, such as the EU. A combination of active adoption by states 
of the FATF standards, together with peer to peer pressure to adopt the standards in order to 
access inter-bank clearing systems etc., without which financial institutions have problems 
operating, and a system of black listing of non-compliant jurisdictions has led to substantial 
global adoption of these standards.  
 
A framework for the governance of new and emerging security threats with a public/private 
nexus can therefore be developed, building on the FATF approach. This could include a peer 
to peer pressure system, to ensure that those commercial operators not directly effectively 
regulated in this context by their own states, are still required to comply with agreed global 
norms, in order to be able to effectively interact with their required service providers, 
advertisers, or their peers. In addition, the commercial operator could be prohibited from 
operating within individual jurisdictions if there is a failure to comply. Implementing 
provisions to meet the requirements of dominant jurisdictions, such as the EU, US and the 
UK would lead, in all likelihood, to new internal governance structures affecting the entirety 
of the commercial operators’ global business, thereby spreading good practice to less 
regulated jurisdictions. When this happens in the context of EU regulation, which often sets 
the highest norms globally for other aspects of commercial transactions, this is known as the 




Bradford’s (2012, p.9) “Brussels effect” relies on neither cooperation nor coercion. When the 
EU imposes its standards “equally on domestic and foreign players” (p.36), the foreign 
companies need to decide whether to produce products or services following a number of 
different regulatory standards, or to the highest set of standards. A commercial entity usually 
decides to adopt the highest set of standards for cost reasons. An example that Bradford 
(2012) used in her writings to evidence the Brussels effect is internet companies, which “find 
it difficult to create different programmes for different markets”, and therefore apply the 
“strictest international standards across the board” (p.25). She cites both Google and General 
Motors amending their global privacy policies to the EU standards (p.6). Google still 
expressly refers to EU standards in its privacy policy for all its customers. 
 
Social media platforms 
 
A similar approach to FATF could be adopted for other public/private security nexuses, such 
as countering radicalisation on social media platforms. Just as the banks know the area of 
financial services better than national law enforcement and security services, so too 
technology commercial operators know social media best, and what solutions would be most 
effective to tackle the security threat. In addition, leading companies in this market are and 
will be continually changing. Holding one company, in one jurisdiction, to task for its 
activities will not lead to a general adoption of standards across the relevant industry. It 
should be remembered that future commercial operators could be legally based in any 
jurisdiction across the globe.  
 
While actual law enforcement and counter-terrorism operations would remain the remit of 
individual states, following their internal legal frameworks, the nodal governance framework 
would operate in two distinct ways; 1. ensuring common standards were maintained by 
commercial operators through their corporate governance framework, and 2. ensuring 
structures and procedures were provided so that information could be reported by the 
commercial operators to the relevant national security and law enforcement agencies, with a 
view to the development of actionable intelligence. As stated by Grabosky (1994, p.196) in a 
wider context, “corporate criminology for the twenty first century will focus on a wider 
regulatory space, and will seek to devise an ordering to harness the interest of third parties in 
developing a new culture of compliance”. Grabosky’s view is becoming increasingly relevant 
in the current age. As Burris, Drahos & Shearing (2005, p.58) point out, the effectiveness of a 
nodal governance framework “depends on how nodal governance is constituted”. Initial 
designs may have to be revised or amended to ensure that the governance of security at a 
public/private security nexus operates effectively. 
 
 
4. The use of Reflexive law-based mechanisms in the governance of security  
 
 
The approach of reflexive law, discussed above, could be taken in the area of the governance 
of security, particularly where a security issue arises at both a transnational level, beyond the 
usual regulatory enforcement space of an individual state, and at a nexus between public 
(security and law enforcement) and private commercial (technology) operators. The 
underlying criminal offences and obligations would have to be clearly legislated for in 
domestic legislation, thereby maintaining the principle of legality. The additionality of an 
approach based on reflexive law is in ensuring that transnational commercial operators 
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manage their businesses in a way that does not undermine national and transnational security. 
In addition, the legal obligation on the private commercial operators should also be covered 
by both criminal and corporate law provisions. Many corporate law provisions already cover 
areas of white collar crime leading to heavy fines and imprisonment. For example insider 
dealing, in the UK, under s.52 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, leads to a fine or 
imprisonment for up to seven years, or both, under s.61. Offences relating to cartels under 
competition law, in the UK, are covered by s.188 of the Enterprise Act 2002, as amended, 
leading to, under s.190 a maximum of five years imprisonment or a fine, or both. This would 
not, therefore, be a completely new development in corporate law.  
 
Corporate governance law could easily accommodate new objectives. For example in the UK, 
the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013 requires 
the reporting of “social, community and human rights issues… including information about 
any policies of the company in relation to those matters and effectiveness of those policies” 
(Section 3, inserting a new Section 414C.7.b.(iii) into the Companies Act 2006), with failure 
to do so leading to a criminal offence under which an individual can be fined (Companies Act 
2006, Section 414A.). An obligation could be placed on private commercial operators to 
report information that they become aware of to relevant public security and law enforcement 
agencies. The counter-terrorism directive could be amended to require member states to 
legislate in this area, and to set up law enforcement and counter-terrorism frameworks to 
receive this information from the corporate world. Relevant domestic company law 
provisions should also set out clear legal requirements to report that security governance 
internal corporate processes are being undertaken, to include the form that it is taking. This 
would avoid any claims that the proposed reflexive law-based mechanisms breached the 
principle of legality.  
 
Reports on internal processes would typically be made by companies to relevant regulatory 
authorities, shareholders and the public in their annual reports. Traditionally a company 
registered (or have its real seat, depending on the jurisdiction), in, for example, China, would 
have to comply with Chinese corporate law. However, if that Chinese private commercial 
operator was doing business in say, the UK, it would, for the purposes of the subject matter of 
this paper, also have to comply with these specific corporate governance and reporting 
provisions under UK law, and to also report to UK company regulators. This would arise if 
the Chinese reporting structures did not allow or permit this type of reporting in China, or if 
those reporting mechanisms were not considered to be of equivalent standard to those in the 
UK. In addition, the Chinese private commercial operators would have to report relevant 
national security sensitive information that it obtained while doing business in the UK, to the 
UK security and law enforcement agencies, if the Chinese security and law enforcement 
agencies were not also in the transnational nodal security governance framework proposed in 
this paper. If the Chinese security and law enforcement agencies were full members of the 
proposed nodal framework on security, then they would be automatically sharing relevant 
information and intelligence with their counterparts in the UK.  
 
The ideas underpinning reflexive law, as conceived in a non-security environment, such as in 
the context of employment or environmental regulation, is legislated for in a manner which 
does not give “specific orders or commands”, but rather by way of establishing “incentives 
and procedures that encourage institutions to think critically, creatively, and [importantly in 
the context of the fast moving technology world,] continually about …their activities” (Orts, 
1995, p.280). This would still be relevant when considering how those activities would affect 
the technological commercial operator/ national security - law enforcement nexus. Constant 
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reflection is therefore required, and reflexive processes set up, in order for law to be 
continuously responsive to evolving situations (Teubner, 1983, p.275). Corporate regulators 
and national security and law enforcement agencies would have to be involved in this process 
of constant reflection on how the evolving legal framework was operating. This could be 
provided for in amendments to the counter-terrorism directive. As Teubner (1983, p.277) has 
stated, the role of the legal system is “to guarantee coordination processes and to compel 
agreement”.  
 
In some policy areas where concepts based on reflexive law have already been deployed, it is 
thought that the shift of responsibility from the State to the market might be sufficient to meet 
the objectives set, such as better environmental or employment regulation, leading to the 
creations of “new public-private hybrid models of governance” (Shaffer, 2011, p.244). This is 
not what is being proposed here. Those responsible for national security and law enforcement 
will not be interested in the State ceding power to the market. Nevertheless new, or at least, 
additional modes of governance are required in order to effectively tackle transnational 
threats. The spreading of the responsibility to provide security, or to support those already 
tasked with the provision of security, is already moving beyond the traditional national 
security and law enforcement agencies, with Bures and Carapicio (2017, p.237) writing about 
the “responsibilization of all sectors of society for collective security”. This responsibilisation 
would include not only the private provision of security services, such as at airports, 
commercial premises, the operation of CCTV etc. but also the tasking of non-security 
providers with security related tasks. For example, the provisions of the Prevent pillar of the 
EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005), as developed and implemented, on terrorism finance 
tracking provisions, the security of explosives, and ensuring that chemicals are not diverted 
from commercial supply chains are all relevant.  
 
It is difficult for legislation to provide a design for the necessary “formal and institutional 
architecture”, given “the multi-layered forms of societal rationalities” which the law needs to 
interact with (Wen, 2016, p.351). It is expected that the relevant sectors would assist in 
designing the necessary frameworks for their particular sector, and then constantly reflect on 
whether the process is working or needs redesign. As pointed out by Zumbanzen (2008, 
p.793), reflexive law-based regulation needs to be “tentative, experimental, and learning”. 
The law itself, and the structures and mechanisms that it aims to develop, requires constant 
self-critical review of the relevant social institutions and their processes (Orts, 1995, p.780). 
The complexity at which any sub-set of society operates, to include both the national security 
and law enforcement agencies, and their potential engagement with the rapidly evolving 
technology sector, precludes the legal framework expressly setting out how internal and intra-
nodal procedures and processes are to be managed. All the law can state is that they have to 
be managed effectively. The complexity of this potential relationship means that a traditional 
command and control legal framework is “bound to fail” (Dorf, 2003, p.395).  
 
Reflexive law-based regulation does also attempt to address the “application of domestic law 
to international actors” (Girard, 2014, p.321). The approach of “reflexive regulation” is to set 
the required objective by way of law, which is mandatory on the legal entities operating 
within a particular jurisdiction but leaving it to the market operators to “determine the most 
efficient and effective ways to achieve [the] desired results” (Girard, 2014, p.338). In 
designing “horizontal” relations, which can extend outside the territorial boundary of an 
individual state, regulation based on reflexive law concepts “seeks to design self-regulating 




The intention behind the use of regulation based on reflexive law is to regulate by creating “a 
level playing field for all businesses” (Wen, 2016, p.21). However, it has been noted that 
larger operators often succeed in having their interpretation adopted by other players in the 
market (Wen, 2016, p.22). Jurisdictions could gain legal leverage over other extra-territorial 
companies whose jurisdictions are not fully integrated into the evolving nodal public/ private 
governance of security framework on the basis of their turn over or effect on the domestic 
market, a tactic that has been effectively deployed to underpin EU Competition law for 
decades (Fox, 1999). 
 
Provisions modelled on reflexive law have already been deployed in particular in 
environmental law, such as the US’s Pollution Prevention Act 1990, and in employment law, 
the EU’s provision on the improvement of health and safety at work (Council Directive 
89/391/EEC), with public disclosure requirements being a key focus of those reflexive law-
based frameworks. This is from where much of the legal academic commentary derives. 
Latterly provisions modelled on some of the aspects of reflexive law have also been deployed 
in the UK (Modern Slavery Act 2015, Section 54) and the US State of California 
(Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010) when dealing with human trafficking. Within the 
EU, provisions modelled on some of the aspects of reflexive law have also been recently 
enacted in Directive 2014/95/EU which addresses the issue of disclosure of non-financial and 
diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups.  
 
Lessons can be learnt from the use of reflexive law in environmental and employment law. 
Alders and Wilthagen (1997, p.436) point out that effective functioning of a system based on 
reflexive law concepts requires “(1) systems monitoring, (2) intermediary structures and 
networks (echoed by Deakin and McLoughlin (2011, p.21)), (3) corporate social 
responsibility, and (4) other market-oriented regulatory tools.” To this could be added, in the 
context of this paper, traditional command and control legislation, specifying supporting 
criminal offences and relevant criminal sanctions, against both individuals and companies, in 
compliance with the principle of legality.  
 
As stated by Alders and Wilthagen (1997 p.436), an effective “reflexive, negotiating 
government does keep (and does need)… certain teeth and claws” when operating a system 
based on reflexive law concepts. In addition, peer to peer pressure could be deployed, as was 
effectively used by the FATF. As pointed out by Deakin and McLoughlin (2011, p.21-22), “a 
reflexive approach does not imply the absence of ‘hard law’”. Rather, they say, “the legal 
framework has a number of roles to play: inducing efficient disclosure, setting default rules 
and encouraging bargaining in the shadow of the law” (p.21-22).  
 
The mechanisms by which a framework based on reflexive law concepts will operate need to 
be “identified, and once identified, must be affirmatively created” (Deakin & McLoughlin, 
2011, p.5). In the context of engagement with the corporate world, the “managerialisation” of 
law is also key, whereby in-house corporate lawyers gain leverage over their internal 
governance structures, and can “use the threat of litigation, with the potential for substantial 
liabilities and wider reputational losses, to persuade employers”, to alter their course (Deakin 
& McLoughlin, 2011, p.6). 
 




Moving on to the issue of how to develop the proposed nodal governance of security 
framework, there is a need to examine which entities would be involved in the development 
and operation of such a nodal governance. The concepts underpinning this develop come 
from another area of debate. In this context it is worth noting that there is an ongoing shift in 
emphasis from state security to global or human security concerns. The focus of the security 
debate is now on protecting all individuals (or in some cases the environment/ the planet) 
whatever the individual’s nationality and where ever they are located. The UN’s Human 
Development Report (UNDP, 1994, p.24) has called for a move away “from an exclusive 
stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security”.  The UN concept of 
human security originates from this UN report (Kaldor, 2008, p.35), but was also developed 
on in the UN Millennium Declaration of the General Assembly of the 8th September 2000. 
This declaration speaks, inter alia, about the need to “take concerted action against 
international terrorism” (p.9, fifth indent), as well as the need to “intensify our efforts to fight 
transnational crime in all its dimensions, including trafficking as well as smuggling in human 
beings and money laundering” (p.9, seventh indent).  
 
The UN’s Commission on Human Security (2003, p.130) has stated that the human security 
approach recognises “the interdependence and interlinkages among the world’s people”, as it 
is no longer possible to isolate one population from another in the context of globalisation. 
Therefore, there is a need to “forge alliances that can yield much greater force together than 
alone” (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p.130). Rather than leading to the 
disappearance of boundaries between states, this is leading to what Kaldor (2008, p.36) refers 
to as the blurring of boundaries between inside and outside the State. This has meant that 
national security agencies, while still tasked with securing a particular state, are now also 
assuming the task of securing human beings in the context of human security, by transmitting 
intelligence to their counterparts in other states in a timely manner and assisting the 
development of their counterparts in other states.  
 
Just as both new technology and increased mobility “have infused the transnationalisation of 
criminal activity” (den Boer, 2008, p.71), the same can be said about terrorism. The human 
security concept is “peopled centred” (UNDP, 1994, p.23), with human beings having a right 
to personal security, not just as protection from “agents of the state”, but also “safety against 
physical assault by private actors” (Donnelly, 2013, p.35). A human security approach 
provides that “all lives ought to weigh the same” (de Wilde, 2008, p.237). This means that 
“nation-states can no longer privilege the lives of their own nationals”  (Glasius & Kaldor, 
2006, p.15), requiring states to intervene to protect those individuals that come within their 
sphere of influence, and who are not being adequately protected, whether it is due to war, or 
in the case of failed or weak states, by their own states (Glasius & Kaldor, 2006, p.15). The 
human security concept, therefore, requires states to act together. The human security focus 
to the emerging analysis, as Wood and Dupont (2006, p.9) point out, requires security to 
“become an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens [or human beings 
whatever their nationality] live in freedom, peace and safety and participate fully in the 
process of governance”.  
 
In the academic analysis of the privatisation of security, where private companies provide 
security services, (a separate category of private business to the commercial operators 
focused on in this contribution,) it has been pointed out that there has been “significant 
pluralization” of security governance (Johnson, 2006, p.33). In the context of public-private 
security provision partnerships there has been a “growing literature on new security 
arrangements” (Bures and Carapicio, 2017, p.235), with a clear indication being made that 
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“the market logic has spilled over the security one” (p.234). Writing about the public/private 
partnerships in the context of military security, Bures and Carrapico (2017, p.236) have 
written about “the relative decline of political and socio-economic steering capacities of 
Westphalian territorially-bound nation-states vis-à-vis the (global) business actors,” and the 
resulting “blurring of traditional boundaries between the political, economic and civil spheres 
of society”. They also speak about the “commodification of security” and the increasing use 
of experts, leading to the view that the private sector can best “deal with security threats and 
risks given its high degree of efficiency” (p.237).  
 
There are already examples in the area of counter-terrorism where “prevention, detection and 
reporting are carried out by private partners” with public agencies having the “analytic and 
repressive” role (Bures and Carrapico, 2017, p.235), for example in aviation, where a variety 
of passenger name recognition schemes operate. In the privatisation of security debate, 
Johnson has stated that “it is necessary to consider how, in a market economy, mechanisms 
can be established to ensure that the collective good is protected in security networks made 
up partly of commercial elements” (Johnson, 2006, p.34). He goes on to point out that the 
“process has been far more complex” than a steering versus rowing analogy would suggest 
(p.33). 
 
The nodal governance model, discussed above, has already been adopted in the context of the 
relationships between public and private security providers operating in a transnational 
context (Johnson, 2006, p.35), with emphasis having been put “on the state’s meta-
authoritative role” (p.50). Lessons can be learnt here which can transfer to the public - 
security/private - commercial operator nexus. As Brodeur (2006, p.ix) has pointed out, nodal 
governance “implies that power flows from a nexus of connected – but not necessarily co-
ordinated – agents rather than from a single well”. Nodal governance is already operating 
well when “professional bodies, trade associations and insurance companies carry out 
regulatory functions” (Johnson, 2006, p.51). A variety of actors similarly operate at a 
transnational level, for example in the context of implementing the FATF provisions where it 
has long been the case that, “private financial institutions are in effect, authorized to make 
security decisions” (Bures and Carapicio, 2017, p.235). This places the State as being a key 
player in security governance, amongst a “network of governing agencies” (Johnson, 2006, 
p.34). Therefore the State, or in the context of the above argument, groups of states, to 
paraphrase Orts (1995, p.280), need to deploy mechanisms based on reflexive law concepts in 
order to “establish incentives and procedures that encourage institutions to think critically, 
creatively, and continually about how their activities affect [human security] and how they 
may improve their [security] performance”.  
 
 
6. Involving the technology companies  
 
The current EU legal provisions on data protection would have little negative impact on the 
above proposals. Importantly the above proposals do not involve the storage of data by 
commercial operators. The recent General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 
(GDPR) does not apply to law enforcement or counter terrorism activities of competent 
authorities, such as national law enforcement (Article 2.d). Legislation requiring commercial 
operators to notify domestic law enforcement once material of relevance to law enforcement 
or counter-terrorism activities is encountered would be a lawful processing of data under 
Article 6.3 GDPR. This obligation to notify should be set out in domestic legislation, or in the 
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case of the EU, also in EU legislation, and be clear and unambiguous, thereby upholding the 
principle of legality. 
 
The regulatory gaps in the 2017 directive on counter-terrorism discussed in this contribution 
appear to have already been identified by the EU Commission, as evidenced by Commission 
Recommendation of 1st March 2018. The European Commission press release (2018), 
entitled “A Europe that Protects: Commission reinforced EU response to illegal content on 
line” talks about “recommending a set of operational measures – accompanied by the 
necessary safeguards – to be taken by companies and Member States”, while it considers 
whether further legislation is required in order to address the issue of illegal online content. 
However, the Commission does state that it “will monitor actions taken in response to this 
Recommendation and determine whether additional steps, including, if necessary legislation, 
are required”. The press release calls for “operational measures to ensure faster detection and 
removal of illegal content online”, to include “clearer ‘notice and action’ procedures”, “more 
efficient tools and proactive technologies”, “stronger safeguards to protect fundamental 
rights”, which are set out in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000, “special attention to 
small companies” and “closer cooperation with authorities”. It goes on to call for “increased 
protection against terrorist content online”, to include a “one-hour rule”, “faster detection and 
effective removal”, an “improved referral system” and “regular reporting”. Similar provisions 
to those set out in the EU’s recommendation could also be adopted in other global standard 
setting economies, such as the US and the UK, which have a proven effect on standards of 
transnationally operating commercial operators, availing of similar transnational reach such 
as the previously discussed “Brussels effect”. It is hoped that an approach based on reflexive 
law concepts is seriously considered when addressing the remaining gaps at the public/private 
security nexus in the 2017 directive in counter-terrorism at an EU level, and that similar 
provisions will also appear in the US and UK-post Brexit regulatory framework addressing 
emerging terrorist related security threats. The involvement of commercial operators in the 
design of laws would not necessarily be a radical departure from the current situation, as 
national and transnational commercial operators, such as internet service providers, have 







With the enactment of Directive (EU) 2017/541 this contribution addresses the security issues 
which arise at the nexus between public (national security and law enforcement) services and 
private commercial operators, such as financial or technology companies. Building on the 
experience of the implementation of the FATF provisions, this contribution recommends the 
development of a nodal governance of security framework, allied with the deployment of 
corporate governance requirements, at least in key economies which have substantial 
leverage over global business, such as the USA, the EU and the UK. While traditional 
command and control legislation used for criminal law has shown its limitations in 
addressing issues arising from rapidly evolving sectors such as novel financial products and 
services, or new ways of using technology, it would still be required to implement related 
criminal law offences, in order to ensure compliance with the principle of legality. For its 
part, corporate governance regulation based on reflexive law principles would be an 
additional tool for national security and law enforcement agencies, if deployed within a nodal 
framework for security. Regulation based on reflexive law should enable national security 
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and law enforcement agencies to benefit from the expertise based in financial services or 
technology-focused commercial operators. A gap clearly exists when considering recent 
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